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1. The model for computing the banks’ loss distribution 
 
De Lisa et al. (2010)1 recently developed a model for estimating the losses coming from banks' 
defaults in a Basel II regulatory framework.  
In the Basel II framework each bank has to satisfy a capital requirement that provides a buffer against 
unexpected losses at a specific level of statistical confidence, set by regulators at 99.9%.  
The model proposed by De Lisa et al. (2010) focuses on the tail risk not covered by the Basel II capital 
requirements by assuming that a bank defaults when its losses exceed the buffer provided by its 
capital. 
In this way the model makes an explicit link between two main pillars of the financial safety net - 
banks' capital requirements and deposit insurance/guarantee - as the latter comes to play a role when 
the former is not sufficient (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Basel II tail risk, and deposit insurance. 
 
 
Bank fails
Basel II Var Losses 
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Loans losses distribution for the bank j
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Moreover, the model has the feature of considering two channels of banking contagion as sources of 
systemic financial instability. The first channel depends on the correlation between banks’ exposures 
that may exist as a consequence of banks’ common exposure to the same borrower or, more generally, 
to a particular influence of the business cycle. The second channel depends on the linkages among 
financial institutions through the interbank credit market (interbank market contagion). 
                                                 
1 De Lisa R, Zedda S., Vallascas F., Campolongo F., Marchesi M., “Modelling Deposit Insurance Scheme Losses in a Basel 2 
Framework, Journal of Financial Services Research, 2010, Second invited revision. 
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The model has been applied to unconsolidated accounting data for a sample of 494 Italian banks for 
the year 2007. The data are drawn from the ABIBANK dataset managed by the Italian Banking 
Association (ABI). 
In a first approach, the Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) loss distribution has been estimated under the 
assumption that a bank default any time its simulated loss is higher than the capital requirements. The 
estimates of the DIS loss distribution thus obtained are reported in the following Tables 1 and 2.  
Table 1 presents the DIS loss distribution considering all simulations, including those where no banks 
fail (unconditional loss distribution). Table 2 presents instead the DIS loss distribution considering 
only those simulations where at least one bank defaults (conditional loss distribution).  
Note that these figures differ from those reported in the paper by De Lisa et al. (2010) as in that case 
the bank is assumed to default only when its actual capital (and not the regulatory capital) is below the 
simulated loss.  
 
Table 1. DIS loss distribution for different values of the loading of common factor β.  Amounts are in m€. 
 
 Loading of common factor β  
(macroeconomic systemic risk factor) 
 30% 50% 70% 
 
Panel A: without interbank contagion 
N. Simulations   10,611,304   13,553,057   13,566,756  
Mean             0.89             0.75             0.91  
Percentile:    
99.90% 0 0 0 
99.99%           1,321              966           1,374  
100.00%         81,841         81,841         84,604  
 
Panel B: with interbank contagion 
N. Simulations   10,611,304   13,553,057   13,566,756  
Mean              4.1              3.7              4.3  
Percentile:    
99.90% 0 0 0 
99.99%           1,321              966           1,379  
100.00%       381,893       381,893       381,893  
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics of the DIS loss distribution, estimated via Monte Carlo simulation, under the assumption of no 
interbank contagion. Panel B presents the same statistics when the simulations consider the impact of interbank contagion. A sample of 
494 Italian banks is employed; accounting data refer to 2007. 
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Table 2. DIS loss distribution constructed on the basis of 10,000 scenarios with at least one bank default for 
different values of the loading of the common factor β.  Amounts are in m€. 
 
 Loadings of common factor β  
(macroeconomic systemic risk factor) 
 30% 50% 70% 
Panel A: without interbank contagion 
Mean             944               1,019               1,233  
St. dev.          4,495               4,780               5,339  
Percentile:    
25%              51                    57                    69  
50%             123                  131                  164  
75%             316                  375                  505  
90%          1,512               1,765               2,284  
95%          3,757               4,120               4,752  
99%        22,451    22,451             26,644  
99.9%        79,479     79,479             79,656  
100%        81,841   81,841             84,604  
 
Panel B: with interbank contagion 
Mean          4,339               4,970               5,796  
St. dev.        37,431    40,358             43,405  
Percentile:    
25%              51                    57                    69  
50%             123                  131                  164  
75%             316                  375                  505  
90%          1,513               1,765               2,284  
95%          3,757               4,120               4,789  
99%        33,341   381,854  381,893  
99.9%      381,893   381,893  381,893  
100%      381,893  381,893   381,893  
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics of the DIS loss distribution, estimated via Monte Carlo simulation, under the assumption of no 
interbank contagion. Only the 10,000 scenarios with at least one bank default are considered. Panel B presents the same statistics when 
the simulations consider the impact of interbank contagion. A sample of 494 Italian banks is employed; accounting data refer to 2007. 
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2. Model policy applications  
The model has several possible applications that are relevant for policy making purposes relating to 
banking prudential regulation. 
 
2.1. The choice of the deposit insurance scheme size 
The model allows the determination of the distribution of banks’ losses that are not covered by banks’ 
capital requirements (excess losses2) and are therefore passed on to other components of the financial 
safety net such as a Deposit Insurance Scheme, or the Government (Fig. 2). And this allows a risk 
based policy choice relating to the size of the Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
 
Figure 2 – Deposit Insurance Scheme funding endowments and part of its loss distribution left to the possible 
intervention of Government (GVMT). 
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Funding needs/financial endowments of an insurance scheme are in fact influenced, most of all, by the 
level of security that one wants to provide to consumers: the higher security one wants to provide with 
a guarantee scheme, the higher the insurance scheme financial endowments/funding needs which will 
be obviously needed. A key policy decision is therefore the choice of the level of security that a DIS is 
expected to provide to consumers. 
                                                 
2 In Section 4, more details are provided on the calculation of excess losses. The results of an alternative method for calculating excess 
losses are also presented. 
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In practical terms, the level of security provided to consumers / depositors is determined in relation to 
the part (statistically, the percentile) of the DIS loss distribution that the DIS financial endowments are 
enough to cover. 
The percentile (level of security) chosen should not only provide a high level of security for consumers 
but also be financially realistic: that is, it should have the potential to be appropriate in terms of 
achieving the objective of a sufficiently high protection of the policyholders, but also do it without 
requiring excessively expensive resources. 
Several risk based criteria can be envisaged to choose the (target) size of a DIS. For instance the 
criterion may be to be able to have funds sufficient to cover the average loss that would hit the DIS in 
all situations where at least one bank default occurs. Following this criterion, the loss distribution 
computed by means of the presented model allows an estimations of the target size of the DIS size, as 
the target size of the fund would correspond in the estimations of the model to the average of the 
conditional loss distribution. For instance, in the case of Italy and of a 50% loading of systematic risk 
factor, the target fund would be 4,970 m€ or 1,019 m€ under the assumption of interbank contagion or 
no interbank contagion respectively (see Table 2). It is worth noticing that the actual size of the Italian 
DIS in 2007 was of 1,602 m€. 
Many other criteria can be chosen as an alternative. Once any criterion has been chosen and a target 
size has been determined, however, the presented model allows with its DIS loss distribution to 
evaluate the level of security (the percentile) associated with the chosen size, providing a valuable risk 
related information: the percentage of loss "scenarios" for which the chosen target fund would not be 
enough (meaning that other types of intervention, for instance by the Government, might be needed).  
 
2.2. Estimating banks' risk contributions 
Once the target size of the DIS has been established, the total amount of money to be collected need to 
be distributed among banks belonging to the DIS in accordance to their risk profiles.  
Several criteria can be used to compute risk-based contributions. Examples of possible criteria have 
been proposed in the report “Possible models for risk-based contributions to EU Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes”3 which takes into account current practices in the EU. 
Here we propose an alternative. The idea is to use the model described above to estimate the 
contribution to the total loss of the system (in percentage) that is attributable to each bank. These 
contributions have been estimated under different assumptions, depending on how inter-bank 
contagion has been taken into account. 
More precisely three different scenarios have been considered: 
(1) Inter-bank contagion is not taken into account. A default can occur only as a consequence of credit 
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losses in the bank portfolio. 
(2) Passive inter-bank contagion is considered. A default may occur also as a consequences of losses 
induced on the analyzed bank from the failures of other banks.  
(3) Passive and active inter-bank contagion is considered. We not only take into account the losses 
that a given bank can receive from the default of another bank , but we also take into account the 
possible contagion effects that the losses of the analyzed bank can passing on via the inter-bank 
market to the other banks. 
In the first scenario the contribution is obtained by running the model via a Monte Carlo simulation, 
without inter-bank contagion, and considering for each bank the sum of all losses transferred to the 
DIS as a consequence of the bank's default. The obtained figures can then be used to derive the 
relative contributions to the total DIS loss attributable to each bank. 
In the second scenario, we use the same approach but we run the model including the possibility of 
inter-bank contagion. 
Finally, the contributions in the third scenario are obtained using the “leave-one-out” approach. The 
model is run to compute first the overall DIS loss and then the loss that would be obtained leaving out 
the analysed bank. The difference between the two losses represents the marginal contribution of the 
given bank to the overall risk.  
The contributions to the total loss (in percentage) attributable to each bank in the three scenarios are 
reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Risk contributions – Italy – 2007 – First 30 banks sorted by first column. 
 
BANCA Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
INTESA SANPAOLO 22.106% 18.076% 15.782% 
UNICREDIT 7.910% 9.245% 5.178% 
MONTE PASCHI DI SIENA 7.155% 6.060% 15.104% 
BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO 5.599% 5.106% 13.890% 
BANCA ANTONVENETA 2.957% 2.697% 12.837% 
B.POP. DI MILANO 2.534% 2.941% 1.647% 
BANCO DI NAPOLI 2.421% 2.904% 2.445% 
CR DI PARMA E PIACENZA 2.304% 2.439% 1.366% 
CREDITO EMILIANO 1.731% 1.782% 0.997% 
BANCO DI BRESCIA 1.658% 1.619% 0.946% 
BIPIELLE 1.553% 1.632% 1.750% 
                                                                                                                                                                       
3 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/2009_06_risk-based-report_en.pdf
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BANCA TOSCANA 1.517% 1.481% 0.829% 
CR DI PADOVA ROVIGO 1.474% 1.283% 0.718% 
BANCA CARIGE 1.335% 1.444% 0.808% 
CREDITO BERGAMASCO 1.232% 1.277% 0.715% 
B.POP. DI NOVARA 1.175% 1.460% 0.832% 
CR DI FIRENZE 1.169% 1.402% 0.785% 
B.P.C.I. 1.030% 0.992% 0.555% 
BANCA DELLE MARCHE 0.978% 0.973% 0.544% 
B.POP. DELL'EMILIA ROMAGNA 0.912% 1.264% 1.136% 
BANCA SELLA 0.874% 0.876% 0.491% 
UNICREDIT PRIVATE BANKING 0.850% 0.830% 0.887% 
BANCA MEDIOLANUM 0.847% 0.827% 0.894% 
BRE 0.832% 0.857% 0.479% 
UNIPOL BANCA 0.830% 1.113% 0.623% 
CR LUCCA PISA LIVORNO 0.764% 0.747% 0.417% 
CREDITO ARTIGIANO 0.686% 0.674% 0.377% 
B.POP. DI VICENZA 0.685% 0.976% 1.403% 
CR IN BOLOGNA 0.618% 0.654% 0.790% 
VENETO BANCA 0.575% 0.714% 0.399% 
 
The risk-based contributions can then be derived by applying these percentages to the target size of the 
fund. 
 
3. Application of the model to other countries  
 
The model developed by De Lisa et al. (2010) has been applied here to other 3 EU countries: UK, 
Germany, and Spain. It should be noticed, however, that for these countries it has been necessary to 
use consolidated rather than individual bank data, data for 2008 and only a more limited sample of 
banks compared to Italy. The first sample is of 23 banks from UK, representing a total of 12.4 trillion 
euro of total assets, the second is of 17 banks from Germany, representing a total of 5 trillion euro of 
total assets, and the third of 54 banks for Spain, representing a total of 3,35 trillion euro. 
The model has been run as in the case of Italy for several million times in order to achieve 10,000 
scenarios containing at least one bank default. The loading of the common macroeconomic systemic 
risk factor has been set to 50%.  
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Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the loss distributions built by considering only the 10,000 scenarios 
containing at least one bank default. These distributions can then be interpreted as the loss distributions 
of the DIS in negative market scenarios. 
Table 4 assumes that the only channel of interbank contagion is represented by the correlation among 
banks’ exposure (no inter-bank contagion), while Table 5 also assume the existence of a direct linkage 
among banks which is due to the inter-bank credit market. 
 
Table 4. DIS conditional loss distribution for UK, Germany, and Spain. No direct interbank contagion is 
assumed. The loading of the common factor β is set to 50%. Amounts are in m€. 
 
 UK DE ES 
Mean 186,602 79,525 25,940 
St. dev. 264,971 116,225 61,416 
Percentile:       
0.25 1,892 7,312 4,175 
0.5 22,334 15,936 8,559 
0.75 262,201 121,493 17,288 
0.9 453,129 170,203 41,919 
0.95 639,512 395,553 136,284 
0.99 1,115,327 395,553 378,750 
0.999 1,117,081 404,956 382,132 
0.9999 1,377,539 517,051 420,688 
1 1,485,207 565,756 617,757 
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Table 5. DIS conditional loss distribution for UK, Germany, and Spain. The existence of direct interbank 
contagion is assumed. The loading of common factor β is set to 50%. Amounts are in m€. 
 
 UK IB DE IB ES IB 
Mean 453,814 290,382 57,703 
St. dev. 1,078,527 464,383 229,909 
Percentile:       
0.25 1,892 7,312 4,175 
0.5 22,334 15,936 8,559 
0.75 262,201 140,119 17,288 
0.9 1,115,327 1,119,432 42,927 
0.95 4,180,117 1,119,432 136,284 
0.99 4,180,117 1,119,432 1,350,573 
0.999 4,180,117 1,119,432 1,350,573 
0.9999 4,181,871 1,119,432 1,357,391 
1 4,181,871 1,119,432 1,357,391 
 
Table 6 reports the total number of simulations that had to be executed for each country in order obtain 
10,000 scenarios with at least one default. 
 
Table 6. Total number of simulations. 
 
UK IB DE IB ES IB 
211,723,252 314,511,715 95,586,108 
 
Table 7 and 8 report the percentiles of the unconditional distributions, respectively in the absence and 
presence of direct interbank contagion. Lower percentiles are not reported as they are all equal to zero, 
as in most simulation scenarios there are no defaults and therefore no loss hitting the fund.  
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Table 7. DIS unconditional loss distribution for UK, Germany, and Spain. No direct interbank contagion is 
assumed. The loading of common factor β is set to 50%. Amounts are in m€. 
 
 UK  DE  ES 
Mean 8.81  2.53  2.71 
Percentile:  Percentile:  Percentile:   
0.999964576 1,892 0.999976154 7,312 0.999921537 4,175 
0.999976384 22,334 0.999984102 15,936 0.999947691 8,559 
0.999988192 262,201 0.999992051 121,493 0.999973846 17,288 
0.999995277 453,129 0.99999682 170,203 0.999989538 41,919 
0.999999528 1,115,327 0.999999682 395,553 0.999998954 378,750 
0.999999953 1,117,081 0.999999968 404,956 0.999999895 382,132 
1 1,485,207 1 565,756 1 617,757 
 
Table 8. DIS unconditional loss distribution for UK, Germany, and Spain. Presence of interbank contagion is 
assumed. The loading of  common factor β is set to 50%. Amounts are in m€. 
 
 UK IB  DE IB  ES IB 
Mean 21.43   9.23   6.04 
Percentile:  Percentile:  Percentile:  
0.999964576 1,892 0.999976154 7312 0.999921537 4175 
0.999976384 22,334 0.999984102 15936 0.999947691 8559 
0.999988192 262,201 0.999992051 140119 0.999973846 17288 
0.999995277 1,115,327 0.99999682 1119432 0.999989538 42927 
0.999999528 4,180,117 0.999999682 1119432 0.999998954 1350573 
0.999999953 4,180,117 0.999999968 1119432 0.999999895 1350573 
1 4,180,117 1 1119432 1 1357391 
 
4. Alternative methodology for the calculation of excess losses 
 
The application of the De Lisa et al. (2010) model that has been shown above, envisages that when a 
bank fails, the amount of the excess loss transferred to the DIS is equal to its worst case value, i.e. the 
value of the banks’ insured deposits.  
This hypothesis is coherent with a worst case scenario where the liquidity needed by the bank is that 
caused by a bank run of all depositors, and therefore equal to the amount of the bank’s insured 
deposits. 
It has, however, also been analysed a no worst case scenario, considering the exact value of banks’ 
excess losses obtained in the performed simulations.  
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The results of the simulations in this case are shown in Tables 9 and 10. Results are reported, for an 
easy comparison, also for the worst case scenario. 
 
Table 9. DIS loss distribution – Loading of common factor β =50% - Amounts are in m€. 
 
  Worst case Exact excess loss 
Panel A: without interbank contagion 
N. Simulations   13,553,057  
Mean             0.75  0.03 
Percentile:    
99.90%  0 0 
99.99%              966  20 
100.00%         81,841  14,388 
 
Panel B: with interbank contagion 
N. Simulations   13,553,057  
Mean              3.7  4.5 
Percentile:    
99.90%  0 0 
99.99%              966  25 
100.00%       381,893  381,893 
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Table 10. DIS loss distribution constructed on the basis of 10,000 scenarios with at least one bank default – 
Loading of common factor β =50% - Amounts are in m€. 
 
  Worst case Exact excess loss 
Panel A: without interbank contagion 
Mean               1,019  24.4 
St. dev.               4,780  208.6 
Percentile:    
25%                    57  0.4 
50%                  131  1.7 
75%                  375  6.5 
90%               1,765  23.9 
95%               4,120  60.7 
99%              22,451  335 
99.9%              79,479  2,801 
100%              81,841  10,072 
 
Panel B: with interbank contagion 
Mean               4,970  4,115 
St. dev.              40,358  38,541 
Percentile:    
25%                    57  0.4 
50%                  131  1.7 
75%                  375  6.7 
90%               1,765  25 
95%               4,120  70 
99%            381,893 363,529 
99.9%            381,893  368,660 
100%            381,893  369,245 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have considered the deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. 
(2010), pointing out its relevance in terms of deposit insurance policies.  
We argue that the model proposed by De Lisa et al. (2010) has two major points of strengths. First of 
all, the model is fully in line with Basel II requirements as it defines the event of “default” as a 
situation where the Basel II bank capital requirements are not sufficient to cope with the bank’s losses.  
On the contrary, the existing literature that aims at estimating the DIS loss distribution is mainly based 
on structural models for credit risk and there is no sign of any consideration of the link that exists 
between banks' capital requirements and the shape and size of the DIS loss distribution.  
Second, the model is extremely flexible and it can provide answers to a number of relevant policy 
questions, among which the following ones.  
First, by estimating the potential loss hitting a DIS under several economic scenarios, we have 
highlighted how the model can be employed to establish the target size of the DIS, which is the 
amount of money that the fund should have available where needed. 
Moreover the model can be used to set the risk-based premia that banks should pay to the DIS 
according to their degree of riskiness.  
In general, we argue that the flexibility of this model makes it very relevant to policy makers, as by 
changing data and assumptions it allows answering various questions relevant to deposit insurance 
regulation.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses a deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. (2010), 
highlighting its policy implications.  
Compared to existing ones, the model proposed by De Lisa et al. (2010) presents the important 
advantage of taking into account Basel II banking regulation, thus linking two pillars of financial 
safety net: banks' capital requirements and deposit insurance.  
The model, which estimates the potential loss hitting a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) under several 
economic scenarios, can be used to establish the target size of the fund, which is the amount of money 
that the DIS should have available in case of need.  
Moreover the model can be used to estimate the contribution (to this loss) that each bank should pay to 
the fund according to its degree of riskiness.  
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